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HEADQUARTER
WAR CRIMES ENCLOSURE CI SCREENING STAFF
APO 407 US ARMY

Date 26 April 1947

STATUS REPORT

(In accordance with the provisions of par 55, g. Chapter VI, Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, dated 10 April 1945, a Status Report on internees is submitted as follows.)

Name RAHN Rudolf Nationality German
(Last) (First) (Middle)

Date of Birth 11 March 1908 Place of Birth Ulm a.Ob.

Last Address Utingen/Wuerttemberg

Date and Place of Arrest CI Mis. Det. Camp 76 Asperg 27 March 1946

Reason for Arrest: Security Threat
Civilian Occupation Ambassador

Former Places of Detention in Chronological Order Camp 76 Asperg transferred
CIE 74 Ludwigsburg transferred to W.S.U. Dachau

Present Place of Detention CIE 29 Dachau

Effective Date of Change of Status 26 April 1947 transferred to #2057 per WOCO 414
Collecting Company

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HERMAN G. KLEIKAMP
Capt. Inf.

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AGENT REPORT
DECLASSIFIED
ON SEP 13 1977
BY OOR USAINTA FOIC
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD5200

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED
PAIN, Rudolf	8 July 1948
3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.	
IX-1992	

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

a. Subject, presently living in URNIGHEF (149/831), Kreis Goepfingen, was a prominent member of the German diplomatic corps. Immediately before the war, Subject was assistant chief of the Public Relations Section of the German Legation in WILNA under Mr. ALTEMEYER (Inu). His next assignment was representative of Foreign Minister Joachim Von RIBBENTROP on a propaganda mission to ANKARA, Turkey. During this mission he also served in Syria and Arabia. After the fall of France, the German Military Government opened an "Administrative Center of the Foreign Office", later absorbed by the Diplomatic Service. Subject was head of the information service for this organization. Subject's next assignment was political advisor to Colonel-General Von ARMIN in North Africa. While serving in this capacity, Subject acquired a good reputation among French and Arab residents of Tunisia.

b. Subject was appointed Ambassador in ROME in 1943. After the Italian surrender, Subject could see no reason to continue what he felt was a "Praetorian Guard" last stand. He claims he was instrumental in preventing the destruction of FLORENCE, VENICE, ROME and MILAN during the German army's retreat. Subject further claims that through his influence, Obergruppenfuhrer WOLF, SS and Polizeifuhrer for Italy, made contact with Alan W. DULLES, US State Department representative, in Switzerland and that the German surrender was a result of this contact. Subject believes his efforts shortened the war from one (1) to four (4) months and prevented all of Austria and possibly lower Bavaria from falling into the Soviet Zone of influence. Subject was interned at the end of the war and released from HUELSEN (150/040) in December, 1947. While he was released without trial, Subject states he is not entirely free.

c. Subject is extremely outspoken in his opinions of American Military Government and his feelings about working with the Americans. While he claims no animosity toward the American capitalists who are trying to build up Germany's industry, he claims that General CLAY's main object seems to be advancement of the HOERSTMAN (sic) Plan. Subject is willing to work for Political Advisor MURPHY in a major role in building up Western European-American solidarity but rejects the idea of serving anyone in the role of a "petty advisor". As long as such persons as HOEGEMEN and General HAEDEK are affiliated with the Americans, Subject claims great reluctance to associate himself with any enterprise.

d. Subject freely admits he is in contact with members of the French Deuxieme Bureau, who see him at his home for political discussions. Although Subject twits them about the shortsightedness, poor logic and extremely poor politics of the French occupation (i.e., disregarding conservation principles by heavily overcutting the Black Forest), these persons silently nod agreement. Subject feels these contacts are the prelude to overtures toward formal franco-german talks and that Foreign Minister BIDAULT will sooner or later permit the situation to get out of hand, which will be the signal for Subject and his colleagues to go to PARIS.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT	SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
WILLIAM H. WOOD, 7970th SICG, Region IX	William H. Wood

WD 341
1 JUN 47

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IX-1992, 7970th CIOG, Region IX, 8 July 1948, Subj: SAHN, Rudolf

At this time Subject intends to arrange a return of German politics to the principles of Frederick the Great, a Franco-German customs and economic union with minimum restrictions on travel between the two (2) countries.

e. These contacts with French Intelligence began early in April, 1948, when Subject received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as Herr SCHMETZ. In later contacts with this man, Subject learned that SCHMETZ is an alias and the man really is Monsieur LAGARDE (sic), head of the Deuxieme Bureau. On a visit early in May, 1948, LAGARDE asked permission to bring some of his friends from the Surete with him on the next visit.

f. As former German Ambassador to Italy, Subject has been classified as a major offender under the denazification law. His trial presently is pending before a Kreis Goepfingen court. Subject claims he doesn't want to mention his anti-Nazi acts in Italy because of the results they had against the Soviets (see par. b). Subject fears the Soviets and insists they already are interested in him because of his considerable influence in North Africa and the Near East. Although he has lost contact with the US State Department, Subject hopes that organization or some other interested agency will intervene so his hearings will not be held.

g. AGENT'S NOTES:

(1) Source and Subject met in 1936 through Source's former chief, Graf WEICZBOK, pre-war German Ambassador to France, and Curt BRAUER, who later became the German Consul in OSLO, Norway. When Subject received his PARIS position (see par. a), he called Source to PARIS and appointed him to a responsible position under his (Subject's) control. When Source was in trouble, Subject intervened with both the Gestapo and the then German Ambassador to France, AMETZ. There appears to be a strong bond between Subject and Source.

(2) From previous experiences of this agent, it is felt that Monsieur LAGARDE actually is Capitaine LECARDE of the RSM office in WILDEAD (IA9/R51), who is known to use an alias similar to the name of SCHMETZ. LECARDE is not the type to have social contacts outside the French Zone without ulterior motives and his acceptance of outspoken German criticism of French policies also is out of character. It is felt that Subject's high opinion of himself makes him a perfect target for a good intelligence officer, such as LECARDE is known to be.

(3) Recommend this information be forwarded to Headquarters, 7970th CIOG, to determine if any agency is interested in Subject. Further recommend this information be forwarded to CIO Region I for exploitation of the lead on French Intelligence activities.

(4) Evaluation of this report is B-2; Source is K-1-IX-FRE.

APPROVED: *I. M. BERBA*
I. M. BERBA
Special Agent, CIOG, s-

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD5200

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Question # (2) Full information is desired on RAHN's contact in ROME with the editor of "Giovinesimo", Dr Arduino MAIURI to whom RAHN indicated great interest in a project to bring the Christian churches of Persia under Papal control.

Answer: RAHN claims that he does not know Dr MAIURI.

Question # (3) What part did RAHN play in the Republican Fascist Intelligence Service plan to send Brigada Nera teams into AOT* in November 1944? Full details are desired on RAHN's contacts with PAVOLINI on matters of intelligence missions, etc.

Answer: RAHN disclaims any knowledge of the sending of Brigada Nera teams into AOT. The diplomatic liaison between the German Embassy and the Fascist group was maintained by Professor Albert BREZNING, cultural attache, now interned in RIMINI, and RAHN claims that BREZNING alone would be in a position to give information on intelligence matters, because of his close association with the Fascist Intelligence Service. The following is known to RAHN about neo-Fascist activities; PAVOLINI, Grand Secretary of the Fascist Party, came to ROME in September 1943 after the Italian Armistice to comply with MUSSOLINI's directive that a new Fascist Regime be established. (RAHN met PAVOLINI on this occasion.) After this neo-Fascist organization was established, PAVOLINI moved to North Italy and settled in MILAN.

Early in 1944 the Fascist party, as a civil organization, was disbanded and made into a para-military group under the name of Brigada Nera (Black Brigade), with headquarters in MILAN. The co-operation of the German troops under SS General Karl WOLFF was assured. In the beginning the Brigada Nera was a small group with probably no more than 10,000 members, but it expanded gradually, partly because of good pay, clothing and food, and partly because its members were allowed to bear arms against the many Partisan groups mushrooming up in the wake of the collapse. Their main job, in fact, was to check these Partisan elements, in addition to safeguarding the harvests and food distribution and to prevent strikes. Each town had its own organization, especially those towns which were near the Partisan mountain strong-holds. PAVOLINI personally headed a group of several hundred men against the Partisans in the Aosta Valley.

RAHN gives the following picture of Partisan activity in Italy: After 8 Sep 43 the internment and the removal of about 700,000 Italian troops had begun. Not all of them reached Germany; about 200,000 fled into the mountains, from where nearly 150,000 returned to their homes, after conditions had quieted down. When Fritz SAUCKEL initiated the labor draft in Italy, the wholesale flights into the mountains began once more, their numbers augmented by thousands of young men of military age, who had become Partisans rather than be drafted into the army. These people were the nucleus of the various Partisan groups later to be formed, several of which were known to RAHN, viz:

(a) A strongly Communistic group, stationed between VERONA and BASSANO, called the Biela Group and known to have maintained liaison with Marshal TITO's Yugoslav Partisans.

(b) The "Fiamme Verde", a catholic organization, north of BRESCIA, allegedly financed and protected by the Catholic Church. (RAHN believes the Bishop of BERGAMO to have been in constant contact with this group. According to RAHN, all national and Catholic organizations were under the over-all leadership of General CADORNA, and close contact was maintained between CADORNA and Cardinal SCHUSTER, as well as with General Mark CLARK.)

*A careful search, together with telephone conversation has failed to reveal the meaning of AOT. RAHN claim to what the word (or abbreviation) refers.

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(c) In the same area a small group with Communist tendencies had also made its appearance, but RAHN's recollections are very vague on the subject.

(d) By far the most powerful group, comprised of two thirds nationalist and one third Communist elements and numbering many thousands, was situated in the Aosta Valley. In RAHN's estimation this Partisan organization was the only one well-equipped with arms and willing, as well as able, to fight under organized command.

(e) A group of about 15,000 men comprised the "Reggio Emilia", hastily organized after the German withdrawal from FLORENCE. This group also had a fine reputation for harassing the then still orderly retreat of the German troops.

In addition to these five groups, there were innumerable smaller ones which had no program and simply banded together for purposes of Pillage and plunder.

Question # (4) What was the nature of contacts between RAHN and Wilhelm MOHNEN? What are the details concerning the abortive meeting arranged for RAHN and the Pope by MOHNEN in October 1943? What does RAHN know of MOHNEN's alleged work in safeguarding Vatican rights and property? What does RAHN know of MOHNEN's remaining in ROME after the German evacuation?

Answer: - RAHN met Wilhelm MOHNEN on two occasions: once in ROME about September 1943 and once in FASANO. MOHNEN was introduced to RAHN by Colonel von VELTHEIM, Air Attache of the Embassy, as his good friend and confidant. RAHN claims that there was absolutely no discussion on politics or diplomacy between him and MOHNEN, and that their conversations were limited to social niceties. RAHN was aware of the fact that MOHNEN, who was especially friendly with Prelate KAAS and Bishop HONDAL, had good connections in the Vatican. MOHNEN also knew WEIZSAECKER, the German Ambassador to the Vatican. RAHN denies, however, that any meeting between the Pope and himself took place.

MOHNEN appeared to be a very devout Christian and always maintained the most cordial attitude towards the Vatican. He kept Colonel von VELTHEIM informed of Vatican opinions, on the international situation, on relations with Germany and conjectures on political developments. Above all he stressed the Vatican's resentment of the way the Pope was being treated by the Nazis.

RAHN thinks it not improbable that MOHNEN undertook the protection of Vatican rights and property and, although he has no facts to offer, he believes that the constant guarding of the Vatican from all sides by General STAHL's troops may have been the result of MOHNEN's efforts.

MOHNEN's motives for settling down in Italy are obscure. Prior to his Italian activities he was engaged in Abwehr work in France, presumably in DIJON. According to von VELTHEIM, who had met him in France, MOHNEN's settling down in Italy was motivated by a desire to get away from the Abwehr. In ROME he was known as an art collector and dealer, obviously a blind to shade his real activities.

Question # (5) Full details are required on a letter, written by RAHN, to assure Georges GUILBAUD's entry into Spain by air in June 1945.

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ANSWER: - Georges GUILBAUD was an official of the Vichy propaganda machine in North Africa in 1942, when RAHN was the German Minister to TUNIS. GUILBAUD, then a young man of 26, was working with the French Youth Movement in TUNIS and endeavoring to win youth's support for the Vichy Regime by various propaganda methods. (Minister MARION of the Propaganda Ministry was his immediate superior.)

GUILBAUD, a former Communist, had spent a few years in Soviet Russia, but fear had turned his admiration and sympathy for the USSR into distrust and dislike. He became an advocate of the "Stop Russia" school, which was the accepted Vichy formula, emphasizing the importance of German-French collaboration as the only means to combat Communist penetration of the West. In March 1943 GUILBAUD returned to PARIS, where he founded a moderately successful collaborationist newspaper. After the Allied invasion, however, he left for Italy, fearing arrest by DE GAULLE. In May 1945 GUILBAUD came to RAHN, afraid for his life, and asked him for assistance in his proposed flight to Spain. RAHN provided an Italian plane, which GUILBAUD shared with the sister of Clara PETACCI, MUSSOLINI's mistress. RAHN also furnished him with a letter, addressed to the German Ambassador to Spain, asking his colleague to offer aid to GUILBAUD. (RAHN claims that he gave GUILBAUD no other papers.) After the plane's arrival in Spain, RAHN lost contact with GUILBAUD.

Personalities most often seen in GUILBAUD's company in TUNIS during 1942 were:

Mr LACOMME of the Service d'Ordre Legionnaire; Mr SCHERB, a journalist; and Mr FIRPI, the police commissioner.

Question # (6) RAHN should give full details on the negotiation with BORGHESE regarding the organization of MAS (Motoscafo Anti-Sommergibile--P T Boats), December 1943-January 1944

Answer: - After BADOGLIO's truce with the Allies on 8 Sep 43, a portion of the Italian Army and Navy joined the Germans. These men were either Fascist or thought the truce to be incompatible with the Italian national honor. Among the leaders of the second group was Prince BORGHESE, a young man of about 30, who at that time was the Commandant of the X MAS Flotilla. BORGHESE, who had the reputation of an outstanding soldier, held the highest Italian decoration, the Medaglia d'Oro. He was a nationalist and ambitious to enlarge the country by adjusting the frontiers along the lines of nationality, and not merely on the basis of adjustments and compromises between the claims of rival states. He frequently voiced his chauvinistic tendencies to the Germans and boasted that he had never been a Fascist, once having been imprisoned by MUSSOLINI in 1943. In his opinion the world's low esteem for Italy was a result of Italy's turncoat policy during the First World War. BORGHESE's proposition to RAHN was to keep the X MAS Flotilla an independent unit under the Italian flag. RAHN referred him to Admiral DOENITZ, with whom BORGHESE came to the following agreement: The Flotilla would be independent except that its operation would have to be coordinated with those of the German Navy. BORGHESE was the only Italian successful in gathering a large number of volunteers (10,000) around him without German help, and apart from being a great organizer, he had suggestive powers and influence over his men. He had great confidence in himself and hoped for the replacement of the Fascist Government by a military one, in which he would play an important role. This new Government would pursue the war against the Allies as the only means of redeeming Italy's lost honor.

BORGHESE's outlook and temperament repeatedly brought him into conflict with the Germans. RAHN, who saw a great asset in him, interceded on his behalf with the German Navy, but despite BORGHESE was only given a limited scope of activity at

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UDINE front with his land-troops to fight Yugoslav Partisans. He fought TITO not only because Yugoslavia was Italy's traditional enemy, but also because to him, TITO represented the Red Danger.

Question # (7) What does RAHN know of a number of Slovene, Croat and Serb agents, sent from COMO to Switzerland with missions from Abt VI in Yugoslavia (see CSDIC/CMF/SD 33) ?

Answer: - Negative.

Question # (8) Full details are desired on RAHN's part in CIANO's arrest by BADOGLIO in August 1943; his transfer to VERONA, trial and execution. What were RIBBENTROP's directives for handling this affair?

Answer: - RAHN claims that the only time he saw CIANO was in October 1943 in MUNICH. MUSSOLINI was there at the time, and RAHN saw CIANO leaving the former DUCE's quarters. CIANO was then living in Bavaria, and it was shortly after meeting with MUSSOLINI that the German Government extradited him to Italy and brought him to VERONA to stand trial for his part in planning the overthrow of MUSSOLINI. This entire scheme was plotted by AVOLINI, General Secretary of the Fascist Party, and RAHN maintains that he was in no way involved in it. HITLER gave RAHN instructions to regard the whole matter as a purely internal Italian incident, and not to interfere with the trial.

In VERONA Edda CIANO attempted to bribe Gruppenfuehrer HARSTER of the SD by offering the now-famous CIANO diary in return for CIANO's escape from prison. She gave HARSTER several excerpts of this diary to warn him of the danger of international repercussions should the diary be published. HARSTER informed HIMMLER of the matter, who in turn discussed the case with HITLER and RIBBENTROP. After a conference it was decided to re-establish the policy of non-intervention in matters concerning CIANO and his fellow-accused, regardless of the existence of the diary. RAHN, who was informed of this decision by RIBBENTROP, discussed the case with PAVOLINI and decided to take Edda CIANO into custody. She escaped during the same night, however, the diary securely tied to her waist.

Question # (9) What are the details of RAHN's contacts with Valerio BENUZZI; specifically, background and outcome of meeting on 7 Jan 44 at FASANO with BICCHIERAI on proposed political re-organization of North Italy? Will RAHN explain how, as he stated, a "misplaced" article by GAYDA in the "Giornale d'Italia" ruined the possibility of peace between Germany and France after the HITLER - PETAIN conversation at MONTAIGNE.

Answer: - RAHN claims that he does not know Valerio BENUZZI.

When RAHN became Ambassador to Italy in September 1943, immediately after the flight of King EMANUEL and Marshal BADOGLIO, conditions in North Italy were chaotic. The collapse of the economic and monetary system was momentarily expected. Food was lacking, and what there was was in the hands of racketeers or inexperienced administrators. German occupation money was flooding the market, and many army units were establishing huge credits with banks in order to assure the smooth running of the German Army. RAHN had numerous conferences on these problems with MUSSOLINI, Finance Minister MORONI, Minister of the Treasury PELLEGRINI, Minister of the Interior BUFFARINI and countless others.

Among the men with whom RAHN conferred was the Catholic priest BICCHIERAI, who was in liaison between Cardinal SCHUSTER and Oberstbannfuhrer [redacted] Chief in MILAN. Since Cardinal SCHUSTER was greatly concerned about the North Italian situation as well as about the strong-arm methods employed by the

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against the Italian population, he sent BICCHIRAI to RAHN in order to ask for help in these matters. BICCHIRAI also begged RAHN to use his influence with the German High Command not to adopt the scorched-earth policy in Italy. RAHN did not consider BICCHIRAI a competent person for discussions of political matters, however, and did not discuss vital questions like the North Italian re-organization with him. (RAHN states that BICCHIRAI was more or less regarded as SCHUSTER's messenger boy.)

Not even the conferences with MUSSOLINI and the Ministers could be called political in the real sense of the word, according to RAHN, as a defeatist sentiment had already permeated these meetings, which dealt mostly with economic questions. MUSSOLINI undertook to finance all Italian war industries under the German armament control and provide for German troops fighting on Italian soil; RAHN issued instructions to all banks, through the Banca d'Italia, not to extend any more credit to German Military Groups and declared the German occupation money worthless to forestall inflation.

On the untimely article by GAYDA, RAHN makes the following statements: Before the HITLER - PETAIN talk at MONTAIGNE, HITLER met FRANCO and General SUVER at HENDAYE. This meeting was secretly arranged and only a very few people were present. One of them was Otto ABTIZ, who told RAHN that a joint German - Spanish attack on GIBRALTAR was discussed. FRANCO agreed to the attack, but held out for large quantities of war material, food and oil, as well as demanding part of French-Morocco. HITLER declined to make promises, and the meeting broke up with the understanding that a second meeting would be arranged in the near future.

ABTIZ believed that HITLER did not wish to commit himself prior to his forthcoming meeting with PETAIN, from which he hoped a great deal. It was also ABTIZ's opinion that HITLER might be receptive to the idea of France retaining her colonies, and possibly even consider the signing of a peace treaty.

Italy's attack on Greece burst like a bombshell upon the Montaigne meeting. HITLER claimed no previous knowledge of the attack and was furious. The unanimous opinion of the diplomats present was that this was MUSSOLINI's answer to the prospective - and unwelcome - French-German understanding. HITLER immediately traveled to FLORENCE to meet MUSSOLINI. In spite of differences in opinion at this meeting, the understanding with France was shelved temporarily due to Italy's opposition and the necessity of upholding the prestige of the Axis.

Shortly afterwards Gauleiter BURKEL began the mass-expulsion of French nationals from Alsace-Lorraine, and Marshal PETAIN considered that he had been deceived by LAVAL and the Germans. At the same time GAYDA's article was published in the "Giornale d'Italia," with demands for Corsica, TUNIS and NICE. RAHN says that GAYDA's article was only one link in the chain of events leading up to the deterioration of the German-French understanding, and that it is doubtful whether relations between the two countries would have improved, even had the article not been printed.

Question # (10) Full details are required on contacts between RAHN and Dr WIRSING.

Answer: - Dr Gisselher WIRSING, whom RAHN met at FABANO in summer of 1939, was a journalist who had formerly been with the magazine "Die Tat" and who was at that time chief editor of the "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten". He was also publishing a monthly periodical under the title of "XX Jahrhundert", and was the author of two "Boundless Continent", and "Ikarus". WIRSING, holder of the Iron Cross, had held the rank of SS Sturmabfuhrer and had served on the Eastern Front. He was in contact with the Info: of the Foreign Office, especially with Minister REICHAARDT. He received propaganda material,

By (BARBARA DINE) (M) (S) 4-20-1000

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One of WIRSING's good friends was Dr TROTT zu SOLZ of the Foreign Office, who was implicated in the 20 Jul 44 attempt on HITLER's life, and was consequently executed. Before the execution WIRSING came to see RAHN in FASANO and asked him to intervene with KALTENBRUNNER on TROTT zu SOLZ' behalf. RAHN sent a cable to the SD Chief, but zu SOLZ had already been found guilty and executed. RAHN claims that his association with WIRSING was largely non-political. He admired WIRSING for his well-founded and diverse knowledge on foreign affairs and thought highly of his latest magazine "Signal", which was appearing under the supervision of the OKW.

Question #(11) Full details on RAHN's knowledge of Princess PIGNATELLI's visit to ROME in April 1944 and the action taken on it.

Answer: - In the Spring of 1944 Princess PIGNATELLI came to the German Embassy to inquire after BARACCA, the Fascist Secretary of State, with whom she had to discuss an important matter. RAHN was informed of her presence in the Embassy and asked her into his office. Princess PIGNATELLI explained that both she and Prince PIGNATELLI were sincere and loyal followers of MUSSOLINI, and that, as such, she had a request to make. She had recently received a letter from her son, an interned Italian officer, in which he complained about the extraordinarily bad treatment he was receiving from the Germans, and she hoped that RAHN would be able to take steps in order to alleviate her son's present lot. RAHN saw MUSSOLINI in the course of the same afternoon and made inquiries about Princess PIGNATELLI. MUSSOLINI informed him that the Princess was a faithful Fascist and that he himself would appreciate it if RAHN would put in a good word for her son, whereupon RAHN got into touch with the proper authorities.

RAHN believes that this was the first and last meeting he had with Princess PIGNATELLI. Later he learned that both she and her husband had been arrested by the Allies on political grounds.

Question #(12) Full details on relations and rivalry with DOLLMAN; RAHN's activities and objectives during the armistice negotiations 1944-1945.

Answer: - SS Standf DOLLMAN, whose acquaintance RAHN made in September 1943, was brought up in ROME, where his mother kept a boarding-house. After finishing his studies he worked as a journalist, and later as interpreter for HIMMLER when the latter visited ROME. Shortly afterwards DOLLMAN was taken into the SS and given a small liaison job with the Italian Minister of the Interior, Guido BUFFARINI. (DOLLMAN also kept in contact with RAHN's predecessor, von MACKENSEN). After BADOGLIO's truce with the Allies, SS O/Gruf and General of the Waffen SS Karl WOLFF, was appointed HSSPf in Italy. He engaged DOLLMAN and put him into an important liaison post with Marshal KESSELRING and with the German General Staff in Italy, a position he held until the end of the War. During that time RAHN only saw DOLLMAN when at the General Staff Headquarters in ROME.

When Armistice negotiations with Mr Allen DULLES began in Switzerland, RAHN and WOLFF decided to send DOLLMAN on the mission as their representative. During these negotiations DOLLMAN appeared to be envious of RAHN's influence on WOLFF. He repeatedly tried to minimize RAHN's efforts by playing up his own role. (RAHN feels that DOLLMAN, fearing the consequences of his SS activities, was almost feverishly attempting to clear himself by obtaining larger roles in talks with DULLES.) RAHN claims, however, that this rivalry did not influence the political side of the negotiations and had no bearing on its outcome.

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Armistice Negotiations. The following is RAHN's account of his thoughts, objectives and activities during the negotiations in 1944 - 1945 and in the period leading up to them:

While Executive Counsellor with the German Embassy at PARIS, in August 1940 RAHN saw clearly that HITLER was not yet ready to prepare the way for peace by instituting a constructive policy in Europe and by reaching an understanding with France. (In 1942, as German Minister to TUNIS, RAHN frequently voiced the opinion to Col Gen von ARNIM that HITLER's pursuance of his war policies would lead to the certain destruction of Germany.)

After the Tunisian campaign RAHN returned to Germany and had occasion to visit HITLER's Headquarters in BERLIN. It was evident to him that Germany was heading for disaster, but nobody had the courage to approach HITLER. RAHN felt that a change in policy was definitely necessary, as hate against Germany was increasing -- (even her satellites were backing out) -- and he foresaw a solid wall of enemy nations surrounding the country.

RAHN undertook to present this view to RIBBENTROP and General JODL through the mediation of Consul General Hasso von ETZDORF, who was then acting as liaison between the Foreign Office and the OKW. While JODL fully agreed, although unwilling to interfere, RIBBENTROP sharply criticized RAHN and asked him to leave everything to the Fuehrer and himself.

Von ETZDORF was ready to organize a movement to overthrow HITLER and sue for peace, but RAHN viewed the success of this plan with scepticism. He warned von ETZDORF that, as the plan did not make provisions for the inclusion of the Officers' Corps, it lacked the precise and systematic build-up necessary for a revolutionary act of such importance. The Nazi Regime was still strong enough to deal with small opposition groups, unless the SS, the only really powerful police force, would associate itself with the opposition.

RAHN, now appointed Ambassador to Italy, attempted to convince SS Obergruppen fuehrer WOLFF of the important part SS troops could play in averting Germany's total economic and military collapse. WOLFF eventually agreed with RAHN and later tried to improve relations with Vatican circles, from which he hoped they might receive assistance.

Early in 1945 RAHN sent Attache GUMBERT to Switzerland to sound out the possibilities of peace negotiations. GUMBERT's trip resulted in the establishment of a contact with "Freies Deutschland" circles; at the same time POZZI, WOLFF's Italian Confidant, succeeded in reaching Mr Allen DULLES, President ROOSEVELT's emissary to Switzerland. WOLFF and RAHN were aware of the fact that no treaty negotiations could be undertaken without the full consent and co-operation of the Wehrmacht; consequently they had to win Marshal KESSELRING, Wehrmacht commander in Italy, over to their side. (It was of particular importance to the future of Germany that the legend of the stab in the back should not prevail in the final peace presentation to the German people, as this might lead to the formation of a new chauvinistic group.) An order for the withdrawal of troops for a last-ditch defense in the SALZBURG area was thought possible; this meant that the last untouched area in the South was threatened by war, and RAHN was spurred into action regardless of risks.

RAHN's next step was to visit Marshal KESSELRING. Knowing KESSELRING's conceit, he emphasized that only KESSELRING was in a position to save Germany before it would be too late. The meeting, was only partially successful, however, as KESSELRING optimistic and would not see the seriousness of the situation, his passive blessing to the contemplated action, but not his active role.

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Standf DOLLMAN was then sent to Switzerland, and returned with the news that DULLES was ready to start negotiations. WOLFF, DOLLMAN and Stubaf WENNER, his Adjutant, went to ZURICH, and a conference was held in the house of Professor HUSSEMAN. As expected, DULLES asked WOLFF to reach an immediate understanding with KESSELRING for the cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Field Marshal ALEXANDER of Great Britain expressed his willingness to postpone temporarily his proposed offensive against the Po Valley.

While WOLFF was still in Switzerland, KESSELRING was appointed Chief of German troops on the western front, and Col Gen von VIETINGHOF took his place in Italy. This change was a bitter blow to the already accomplished work and meant a considerable delay in negotiations, at least until VIETINGHOF's reaction to the plan could be ascertained. VIETINGHOF, also regarded further resistance as useless, but did not want to make any decisions, since he only considered himself a substitute for KESSELRING. His Chief of Staff, Gen ROETTIGER, as well as Gen RITTLER von POHL, Commanding General of the Luftwaffe in Italy, were more than willing to play whatever part was allotted to them, however.

News of contact with the Allies soon reached Headquarters in BERLIN. Both RAHN and WOLFF were ordered to BERLIN by RIBBENTROP and HIMMLER respectively. Only WOLFF obeyed the command, RAHN claiming that he was engaged on urgent matters. WOLFF asked HIMMLER to use his utmost influence on HITLER to persuade him not to prosecute the war to the point of utter destruction. He also reminded HIMMLER that his oath of allegiance was made to the people of Germany, and not to one man alone. (Neither RAHN nor WOLFF knew at that time that HIMMLER had already contacted Count BERNADOTTE of Sweden to act as an intermediary in a truce with the Allies.)

Field Marshal ALEXANDER, impatient because of the delay, was ready to start his push; Mr DULLES in Switzerland was likewise dissatisfied with the slow progress, and RAHN, fearing a collapse of the negotiations, volunteered to go to Switzerland to convince the Allies of the earnest desire of some German elements for peace. Just then, to his surprise, Gauleiter HOFER indicated willingness to co-operate, even to the extent of placing HITLER in a lunatic asylum, should he venture into South Germany. HITLER still believed that he alone was the master of Germany's destiny, and his intention to defend the Alpine front was widely circulated.

With HOFER's help, RAHN, VIETINGHOF, who had reconsidered, ROETTIGER and WOLFF got together to plan new negotiations with Mr DULLES. Because of his earlier contacts, WOLFF, accompanied by WENNER and Obst/Lt von SCHWEINETZ (VIETINGHOF's representative), was selected to go to Switzerland instead of RAHN. Two of Field Marshal ALEXANDER's representatives were already waiting for WOLFF, who designated WENNER and von SCHWEINETZ to sign the capitulation. WOLFF himself tried to return to FASANO immediately, but was blocked by Italian Partisans at Lake Como. In the meantime Field Marshal ALEXANDER's troops had already crossed the Po and were making rapid strides toward North Italy. RAHN had to leave FASANO and establish headquarters at MERANO, while VIETINGHOF and his staff moved to BOLSANO.

Events now followed each other in rapid succession: Field Marshal KESSELRING was re-appointed Commanding General of Italy. WOLFF was released through the intervention of the American Consul in LUGANO. KESSELRING telephoned RAHN and accused him of exceeding his authority in allowing the capitulation to be signed by WENNER and SCHWEINETZ behind his back. As a consequence he dismissed VIETINGHOF and ROETTIGER on the following day, and appointed Gen SCHULZ as Chief of Staff, requesting KALTENBRUNNER to take over the post.

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Gen WOLFF surrounded his quarters with tanks and made ready to defend himself against arrest by KALTENBRUNNER. VIETINGHOF disappeared, but ROETTIGER, who had taken steps to invalidate his removal, had General SCHULTZ arrested the following day. SCHULTZ, however, was freed by some officers, and immediately arrested ROETTIGER. The situation was completely chaotic. When HITLER's death was announced over the radio, however, KESSELRING agreed to the capitulation and reinstated VIETINGHOF, while RAHN traveled to MHRANO to await the entry of the American troops.

a. Answers to brief from SSU, WARREC, File USE 234, dated 17 Sep 46

Question #(13) Relations with Syrian political parties, particularly the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien), and the Arab Popular Party of ALEPPO, (Rifai Group).

Answer: - Negative.

Question #(14) Relations with prominent Syrian and Lebanese politicians, particularly with the SOLH family. (It is known that the Germans regarded Sami SOLH as an agent and had given him means to identify himself.)

Answer: - When RAHN was convalescing in Germany after an illness in 1941, Otto ABETZ summoned him to PARIS, where RAHN was at that time Councillor of Legation with the German Embassy. A meeting followed during which ABETZ allegedly stated that he no longer believed in a German victory and proposed to take preliminary steps for peace, or at least a temporary truce, with France. A big obstacle to his plans, however, was HITLER's distrust of the Vichy Government and his reluctance to believe that France would ever be a loyal partner to Germany's aspirations. Therefore it was necessary to convince HITLER of French co-operation.

The first step was an agreement between DARLAN and ABETZ to instruct the Syrian Resident Governor, General DENTZ, to permit flights of German airplanes over Syrian territory in Iraq, and to offer the Iraq Government German arms and help against the British. ABETZ urged RAHN to fly to BEIRUT immediately to explain the motives of these instructions to DENTZ. RAHN was given a false passport under the name of Robert RENCUARD and reached BEIRUT on 10 May 41. (German nationals were not welcome in Syria at that time, and although DENTZ and his staff were aware of RAHN's identity, it was a good policy not to have it generally known.) DENTZ complained to RAHN about von HENTIG, a German Foreign Office expert on Arabian matters, whose frequent trips to Arab circles in Syria invariably resulted in widespread demonstrations against the French. RAHN's suggestion as a solution for this problem was independence for Syria and Lebanon. On that particular day there had been demonstrations in BEIRUT, DAMASCUS and HAMA.

DENTZ, eager to solicit RAHN's help, suggested that RAHN himself should contact the Syrian nationalists as to their present wishes. An agreement was reached that RAHN, accompanied by one officer of the Deuxieme Bureau, should contact Sami SOLH, a prominent and popular lawyer in BEIRUT. (RAHN states that he knows SOLH only as a patriot and has no knowledge of his being an agent.) During their meeting on the following day, RAHN explained to SOLH that any future French-Syrian understanding as to self-rule depended entirely on the co-operation given to the French General Staff in their plan to support Iraq against a British invasion. He also requested that an assurance be given to General DENTZ that nationalist Arab uprisings would cease immediately.

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